Anwar Sadat

Anwar Sadat

Anwar Sadat ble født 25. desember 1918 i Mit Abu al-Dum, al-Minufiyah, Egypt. Han gikk på Royal Military Academy i Kairo, hvor han ble uteksaminert og begynte i Free Officers -bevegelsen, som var forpliktet til å frigjøre Egypt fra britisk kontroll.I et forsøk på å kvitte Egypt fra britiske styrker under andre verdenskrig, ble Sadat fanget og fengslet av britene . Med sin erfaring flyttet han opp for å bli visepresident under Gamal Abdal Nasser.Året etter døde Nasser, og Sadat tok kontroll over presidentskapet. I 1973 seiret Sadat mot Israel i Yom Kippur -krigen, noe som økte hans lands moral og gjorde ham til "Crossing Hero." I november 1977 foretok Sadat det første offisielle besøket til Israels leder, Menachem Begin, for å prøve å få Med tilrettelegging fra USA Etter mye uro etter Camp David -avtalene, ble Saddat upopulær i noen arabiske kretser, noe som resulterte i at han ble myrdet av egyptiske islamske jihadorganisasjonsmedlemmer 6. oktober 1981.


Etter Camp David -avtalene delte Sadat og Israels statsminister Menachem Begin 1978 Nobels fredspris. Imidlertid ble den påfølgende fredsavtalen mellom Egypt og Israel fra 1979 mottatt med kontrovers blant arabiske nasjoner, spesielt palestinerne. Egypts medlemskap i den arabiske liga ble suspendert (og ikke gjenopptatt før i 1989). [3] PLO -leder Yasser Arafat sa "La dem signere det de liker. Falsk fred vil ikke vare." [4] I Egypt brukte forskjellige jihadistgrupper, som egyptisk islamsk jihad og al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya, Camp David-avtalene for å samle støtte for deres sak. [5] Tidligere var det sympatisk for Sadat's forsøk på å integrere dem i det egyptiske samfunnet, [6] Egypts islamister følte seg nå forrådt og ba offentlig om å kaste den egyptiske presidenten og erstatte nasjonens styresystem med en regjering basert på islamsk teokrati . [6] En fatwa som godkjente attentatet var innhentet fra Omar Abdel-Rahman, en geistlig som senere ble dømt i USA for sin rolle i bombingen av World Trade Center i 1993. [ trenger Kilde ]

De siste månedene av Sadat -presidentskapet var preget av intern opprør. Han avviste påstander om at opptøyene ble opphisset av innenlandske spørsmål, og trodde at Sovjetunionen rekrutterte sine regionale allierte i Libya og Syria for å oppfordre til et opprør som til slutt ville tvinge ham ut av makten. Etter et mislykket militærkupp i juni 1981 beordret Sadat et stort angrep som resulterte i arrestasjon av mange opposisjonsfigurer. Selv om han fortsatt opprettholdt høy popularitet i Egypt, har det blitt sagt at han ble myrdet "på toppen" av sin upopularitet. [7]

Egyptisk islamsk jihad Rediger

Tidligere i Sadat -presidentskapet hadde islamister tjent på "opprydningsrevolusjonen" og løslatelsen fra aktivister fengslet under Gamal Abdel Nasser, [8] men hans Sinai -traktat med Israel gjorde islamister rasende, særlig den radikale egyptiske islamske jihad. I følge intervjuer og informasjon samlet av journalist Lawrence Wright, rekrutterte gruppen militære offiserer og samlet våpen, og ventet på det rette øyeblikket for å starte "en fullstendig styrt av den eksisterende orden" i Egypt. Hovedstrateg for El-Jihad var Abbud al-Zumar, en oberst i militær etterretning hvis plan var å drepe landets hovedledere, fange hovedkvarteret for hæren og statssikkerhet, telefonbussbygningen og selvfølgelig radio- og fjernsynsbygning, hvor nyhetene om den islamske revolusjonen deretter vil bli sendt, og slippe løs - han forventet - et folkelig opprør mot sekulær myndighet over hele landet. " [9]

I februar 1981 ble egyptiske myndigheter varslet om El-Jihads plan ved arrestasjon av en operatør som hadde avgjørende informasjon. I september beordret Sadat en svært upopulær samling av mer enn 1500 mennesker, inkludert mange Jihad -medlemmer, men også den koptiske paven og andre koptiske geistlige, intellektuelle og aktivister i alle ideologiske striper. [10] All ikke-offentlig press ble også forbudt. [11] Samlingen savnet en jihad -celle i militæret ledet av løytnant Khalid Islambouli, som ville lykkes med å myrde Anwar Sadat den oktober. [12]

I følge Tala'at Qasim, tidligere leder for Gama'a Islamiyya som ble intervjuet i Midtøsten -rapport, det var ikke Islamic Jihad, men organisasjonen hans, kjent på engelsk som "Islamic Group", som organiserte attentatet og rekrutterte leiemorderen (Islambouli). Medlemmer av gruppens "Majlis el-Shura" ("rådgivende råd")-ledet av den berømte "blinde shaykh"-ble arrestert to uker før drapet, men de avslørte ikke de eksisterende planene, og Islambouli lyktes i å myrde Sadat. [1. 3]

Oktober 1981 ble det avholdt en seiersparade i Kairo for å minnes åtteårsdagen for Egypts kryssing av Suez -kanalen. [1] Sadat ble beskyttet av fire lag med sikkerhet og åtte livvakter, og hærparaden skulle ha vært trygg på grunn av ammunisjonsbeslagsregler. Mens egyptiske luftvåpenets Mirage -jetfly fløy overhead og distraherte mengden, soldater fra egyptiske hærer og troppebiler som slepte artilleri. En lastebil inneholdt attentatlaget, ledet av løytnant Khalid Islambouli. Da den passerte tribunen, tvang Islambouli sjåføren med pistol til å stoppe. Derfra gikk leiemorderne av og Islambouli nærmet seg Sadat med tre håndgranater skjult under hjelmen. Sadat stod for å motta sin hilsen Anwars nevø Talaat El Sadat sa senere: "Presidenten trodde drapsmennene var en del av showet da de nærmet seg tribunen og avfyrte dem," [14], hvorpå Islambouli kastet alle granatene hans mot Sadat , bare ett av dem eksploderte (men kom til kort), og ytterligere leiemordere reiste seg fra lastebilen og skjøt på en vilkårlig måte AK-47-gevær og Port Said-maskinpistoler på tribunen til de hadde tømt ammunisjonen, og deretter forsøkte å flykte. Etter at Sadat ble truffet og hadde falt til bakken, kastet folk stoler rundt ham for å beskytte ham mot kulen.

Angrepet varte i omtrent to minutter. Sadat og ti andre ble drept direkte eller påført dødelige sår, inkludert generalmajor Hassan Allam, Khalfan Nasser Mohammed (en general fra den omanske delegasjonen), Eng. Samir Helmy Ibrahim, Al Anba 'Samuel, Mohammed Yousuf Rashwan (presidentfotografen), Saeed Abdel Raouf Bakr, kinesisk ingeniør Zhang Baoyu [zh], [15] samt den cubanske ambassadøren i Egypt, og en koptisk ortodoks biskop, Anba Samuel for sosiale og økumeniske tjenester.

Tjueåtte ble såret, inkludert visepresident Hosni Mubarak, irsk forsvarsminister James Tully og fire amerikanske militære forbindelsesoffiserer. Sikkerhetsstyrker ble midlertidig bedøvet, men reagerte innen 45 sekunder. Den svenske ambassadøren Olov Ternström klarte å unnslippe uskadd. [16] [17] En av angriperne ble drept, og de tre andre ble skadet og arrestert. Sadat ble fraktet til et militærsykehus, [18] hvor elleve leger opererte ham. [ trenger Kilde ] Han døde nesten to timer etter at han ble kjørt til sykehuset. [18] Sadats død ble tilskrevet "voldsomt nervøst sjokk og indre blødninger i brysthulen, der venstre lunge og store blodårer under den ble revet." [19]

I forbindelse med attentatet ble det organisert en opprør i Asyut i Øvre Egypt. Opprørerne tok kontroll over byen i noen dager, og 68 politifolk og soldater ble drept i kampene. Regjeringens kontroll ble ikke gjenopprettet før fallskjermjegere fra Kairo ankom. De fleste av de militante som ble dømt for kamp, ​​fikk lette straffer og sonet bare tre års fengsel. [20]

Begravelse Rediger

Sadat ble gravlagt i Unknown Soldier Memorial, som ligger i Nasr City -distriktet i Kairo. Inskripsjonen på graven hans lyder: "Krigen og fredens helt". [14]

Først ble Sadat etterfulgt av Sufi Abu Taleb som fungerende president i Egypt i åtte dager fram til 14. oktober 1981, da Sadats visepresident, Hosni Mubarak, ble den nye egyptiske presidenten i nesten 30 år til han trakk seg som følge av den egyptiske revolusjonen. av 2011.

Assassins Rediger

Islambouli og de andre leiemorderne ble prøvd, funnet skyldige og dømt til døden. De ble henrettet 15. april 1982, to hærmenn ved skyting og tre sivile ved henging. [21]


Hvorfor kastet Sadat Sovjet ut av Egypt?

Beslutningen av den egyptiske presidenten Anwar al-Sadat om å fjerne den sovjetiske militære tilstedeværelsen fra landet hans sommeren 1972 har ofte blitt sett på som det første trinnet på veien mot oktoberkrigen året etter. Ved å fjerne den sovjetiske tilstedeværelsen, har det blitt hevdet, fjernet Sadat også den største hindringen som hindret ham i å delta i en ny krig med Israel. (1) Selv om Sadat på den tiden insisterte på at utvisningen av Sovjet rett og slett var et resultat av den voksende forskjellene mellom Moskva og Kairo, (2) og mens andre har hevdet at fjerningen deres var et direkte resultat av den sovjet-amerikanske sperren, (3) virket det klart at siden Moskva var imot å risikere sitt nye forhold til USA ved å støtte Egypt i en annen krig med Israel, hadde Sadat ikke annet valg enn å be om avreise.

I Washington ble amerikanske tjenestemenn angivelig & quotshocked & quot for å få vite om Sadats kunngjøring. Henry Kissinger husket senere at Sadats beslutning kom som en "fullstendig overraskelse for Washington", og han møtte raskt den sovjetiske ambassadøren for å fjerne enhver oppfatning om at USA hadde samarbeidet med egypterne for å nå dette målet. (4) President Nixon, på samme måte, skyndte seg et brev til Leonid Brezjnev, og påsto at USA hadde "avansert kunnskap om de siste hendelsene i Egypt," 5)

Tidlig vitenskapelig behandling av Sadat sin beslutning om å fjerne den sovjetiske militære tilstedeværelsen har generelt falt i tråd med denne offisielle beretningen. William B. Quandt, for eksempel, argumenterte for at utvisningen av de sovjetiske rådgiverne kom på & quotcious & quot tid i Washington siden Nixon var opptatt av en valgkampanje og ikke ville risikere hans ledelse i meningsmålingene og ved å gå i gang med en kontroversiell politikk i Midtøsten. & quot (6) I sin undersøkelse av det sovjetisk-egyptiske forholdet konkluderte Alvin Z. Rubinstein også med at & kvoter så langt det kan fastslås at Sadat konsulterte ingen hans beslutning var hans egen. & quot

Nyere har forskere plassert utvisningen i sammenheng med forholdene mellom Sovjet-Amerika i stedet for i det forverrede forholdet mellom Egypt og Russland. Etter Raymond L. Garthoffs oppfatning var det avtalene som ble inngått mellom USA og Sovjetunionen under toppmøtet i Moskva i 1972, som effektivt satte den arabisk-israelske konflikten på bakbrenneren, som ble "siste halm" for Sadat. (8) Henry Kissinger nådde lignende konklusjoner i studien Diplomacy fra 1994, der han argumenterte for at det første tegnet på at [detente] hadde innvirkning kom i 1972 [da] Egypts president Anwar Sadat avskjediget alle sine sovjetiske militære rådgivere og ba sovjetiske teknikere om å forlate landet . & quot (9)

Uten arkivbevis gjenstår imidlertid flere spørsmål rundt Sadats beslutning om å utvise den sovjetiske militære tilstedeværelsen fra Egypt: I hvilken grad hadde USA forhåndskunnskap om Sadats intensjoner? Har USA jobbet med Sadat for å søke fjerning av Sovjet? Og var utvisningen av den sovjetiske militære tilstedeværelsen fra Egypt virkelig det første skrittet mot oktoberkrigen, som noen har hevdet, eller var det bare den enkleste måten for Sadat å fortelle USA at han var forberedt på å ta Egypt i en ny retning ?

Nytt materiale som dukker opp fra amerikanske arkiver og oppsummert i denne artikkelen antyder at Sadats beslutning om å fjerne de sovjetiske rådgiverne neppe var den overraskelsen som amerikanske tjenestemenn senere hevdet det var. Dokumenter som nå er avklassifisert fra utenriksdepartementet og National Security Council -filer, samt mange timer med innspilte samtaler mellom president Nixon og hans senior utenrikspolitiske rådgivere, viser at allerede i mai 1971, over et år før utvisningen av de sovjetiske rådgiverne, amerikanske tjenestemenn var godt klar over Sadat's intensjoner og jobbet aggressivt for å sikre at den sovjetiske tilstedeværelsen ble fjernet fra Egypt. Gjennom sommeren 1971, viser disse kildene, tok Nixon -administrasjonen mange skritt for å hjelpe Sadat med å fjerne den sovjetiske militære tilstedeværelsen fra landet hans. Vi vet nå faktisk at Nixons beslutning om å stanse levering av fly til Israel i slutten av juni, og hans beslutning om å aggressivt presse på for gjenåpning av Suez -kanalen som en del av en midlertidig avtale mellom Egypt og Israel, hadde like mye mye å gjøre med å få sovjeterne ut av Egypt som det gjorde med å finne en langsiktig fredsavtale mellom Egypt og Israel.

Like viktig viser imidlertid disse nye kildene at utvisningen av den sovjetiske militære tilstedeværelsen hadde svært lite å gjøre med å forberede Egypt til en ny krig med Israel. For Sadat var beslutningen om å fjerne Sovjet klart en avgjørelse han hadde tatt fra de første dagene av sitt presidentskap for ikke bare å komme mye nærmere Vesten, men å unngå nok en krig med Israel, som han visste at Egypt utvilsomt ville tape.


27 bilder av hendelsene rundt Anwar Sadat -attentatet

Muhammad Anwar el-Sadat var Egypts tredje president, som tjenestegjorde fra 15. oktober 1970 til han ble myrdet av fundamentalistiske hæroffiserer 6. oktober 1981. I sine elleve år som president gjeninnførte han flerpartisystemet, som ble lansert Infitahs økonomiske system som tillot private investeringer i Egypt, brøt partnerskap med sin velgjører, USSR, skapte relasjoner med USA og begynte en fredsprosess med Israel. Sadat & rsquos -forhandlinger med Israels statsminister Menachem Begin vant begge menn Nobels fredspris, noe som gjorde Sadat til den første muslimske nobelprisvinneren.

Den egyptiske reaksjonen på Sadat & rsquos-traktaten, Egypt-Israel fredstraktaten fra 1979, som returnerte Saini til Egypt, var generelt gunstig blant innbyggerne, men den ble avvist av Det muslimske brorskapet, som mente Sadat hadde forlatt arbeidet med å sikre en palestinsk stat. Den arabiske verden og Palestina Liberation Organization (PLO) motsatte seg Sadat & rsquos forsøk på å inngå fred med Israel uten å konsultere de arabiske statene først. Fredsavtalen var en av de viktigste faktorene som førte til hans attentat.

PLO -leder Yasser Arafat sa om traktaten, og la dem signere hva de liker. Falsk fred vil ikke vare. & Rdquo Egypt & rsquos posisjon i Arab League ble suspendert. De egyptiske islamistene følte seg forrådt av Sadat og ba offentlig om å bli fjernet og erstatte ham med en islamsk teokratisk regjering.

De siste månedene av Sadat & rsquos presidentskap var plaget av interne opprør. Sadat mente at opprørene var forårsaket av at Sovjetunionen rekrutterte regionale allierte i Libya og Syria til å oppmuntre til et kupp. I februar 1981 fikk Sadat vite om en plan om å avsette ham. Han svarte med å arrestere 1500 av hans politiske opposisjon, Jihad -medlemmer, den koptiske paven og andre koptiske geistlige, intellektuelle og aktivister. Han forbød all ikke-offentlig presse. De omfattende arrestasjonene savnet en Jihad -celle i militæret ledet av løytnant Khalid Islambouli, som ville lykkes med å myrde Sadat.

Oktober 1981 ble Anwar Sadat myrdet under den årlige seiersparaden som ble holdt i Kairo, og feiret Operation Badr, hvor den egyptiske hæren hadde krysset Suez -kanalen og tatt tilbake en liten del av Saini -halvøya fra Israel i begynnelsen av Yom Kippur -krigen. En fatwa, en autoritativ juridisk tolkning som en kvalifisert mufti gir om spørsmål knyttet til islamsk lov, som godkjente attentatet, var innhentet fra Omar Abdel-Rahman, en geistlig dømt i USA for sin rolle i bombingen av World Trade Center i 1993.

Sadat ble beskyttet av fire lag med sikkerhet, åtte livvakter, og paraden skulle ha vært trygg på grunn av ammunisjonsbeslagsregler. Da paraden fortsatte, tvang en lastebil, som inneholdt attentatgruppen, ledet av løytnant Khalid Islambouli, sjåføren til å stoppe med pistol. Morderne gikk av og nærmet seg Sadat med tre håndgranater. Sadat, og trodde at mennene skulle hilse, sto, og da kastet Islambouli granatene. Ytterligere leiemordere reiste seg fra lastebilen som skjøt AK-47-gevær til tribunene til de hadde gått tom for ammunisjon.

Angrepet varte i omtrent to minutter. Sadat og ti andre ble drept eller påført dødelige sår, inkludert den cubanske ambassadøren i Egypt, og en koptisk ortodoks biskop. 28 ble såret, inkludert visepresident Hosni Mubarak, irsk forsvarsminister James Tully og fire amerikanske militære forbindelsesoffiserer.

I forbindelse med attentatet ble det organisert en opprør i Asyut. Opprørerne tok kontroll over byen i noen dager, og 68 soldater og politifolk ble drept i kampene. Regjeringens kontroll ble ikke gjenopprettet før fallskjermjegere fra Kairo ankom.

Islambouli og de andre ble prøvd, dømt til døden og henrettet i april 1982.

Anwar Sadat med jordanske verter på Dome of the Rock, desember 1955. Martin Kramer Anwar Sadat i båten hans på Suez -kanalen. Getty Egypts president Sadat møter Israels statsminister Menachem Begin for samtaler om normalisering av forholdet mellom deres to land. Møtet fant sted i Aswan i Øvre Egypt. I 1978 ble begge menn tildelt Nobels fredspris. Getty Egypts president Anwar Sadat og Israels statsminister Menachem Begin under en pressekonferanse. 1. september 1979. Menachem Begin, Jimmy Carter og Anwar Sadat på Camp David, Maryland, diskuterer ny fredsavtale mellom Israel og Egypt. Getty Den egyptiske presidenten Anwar Sadat og den israelske statsministeren Menachem Begin håndhilser mens USAs president Jimmy Carter ser på under seremonier for undertegnelsen av Midtøst -fredsavtalen på Det hvite hus, 1. mars 1979. Getty Anwar Sadat, 1981. Pinterest Anwar Sadat, hvis fredspakt med Israel ga ham Nobels fredspris mens han fremmedgjorde andre arabiske ledere, ble skutt av medlemmer av hans egen hær. BT President Anwar Sadat (til høyre) og hans daværende stedfortreder, Hosni Mubarak, på militærparaden der Sadat noen minutter senere ble skutt av fire hæroffiserer. Kreditt- AFP FOTO: AFP: GettyImages Sadat og andre politikere på Victory Parade til ære for Operation Badr og gjenerobringen av Sinai -halvøya. Youtube Militære jetfly flyr overhead under paraden, og etterlater fargerike stier i kjølvannet. Youtube Egyptiske militære kjøretøyer på parade ved seiersfeiringen. Youtube Lastebilen som inneholdt attentatgruppen, ledet av løytnant Khalid Islambouli, tvang sjåføren til å stoppe med pistol. Youtube


Muhammad Anwar el-Sadat

Som initiativtaker til både krig og fred, er Muhammad Anwar el-Sadat en kontroversiell historisk skikkelse. Hva med å sette i gang et kupp med Tyskland mot britiske styrker i andre verdenskrig, lede Yom Kippur -krigen mot Israel og angivelig forråde Det muslimske brorskapet ved å inngå en fredsavtale med Israel, kan Anwar Sadat være kjent som en komplisert helt for noen, men som en utilgivelig forræder for andre.

Muhammad Anwar el-Sadat (bilde av History.com)

Anwar Sadat ble født 25. desember 1918 og tilbrakte barndommen i Mit Abul-Kum, Egypt, sammen med foreldrene og tretten søsken (Bibliography.com Anwar Sadat 1). Gjennom å jobbe med mennesker på en kollektiv måte fant han tilfredshet og betydning i å være en del av noe mye mer enn familien eller samfunnet han så verdi i land av Egypt selv (Anwar Sadat 2). Dette aspektet av hans oppvekst bidro til hans lidenskap for å bringe Egypt tilbake under lokalt styre, da Storbritannia fremdeles kontrollerte landet i løpet av den tiden (Bibliography.com).

I landsbyen hans gikk han inn på Koranic Teaching School før han flyttet til en koptisk kristen skole - alt på grunn av innflytelsen fra bestemoren, som hadde håp om at han skulle få en utdannelse til å være sjeik i en moské (Anwar Sadat 4). Hun var en innflytelsesrik person i hans tidlige liv, og innpodet en tradisjonell ballade i hjertet hans som uttrykte den store viktigheten og heltemodigheten i å motstå britene (Anwar Sadat 6). Denne balladen, som fortalte om Zahran, en heroisk skikkelse som ledet en kamp mot britene før han ble hengt for handlingene hans, ble en annen viktig katalysator for Sadats hat mot undertrykkelse og hans intense streben etter Egypts uavhengighet (Anwar Sadat 6).

Sadat i den egyptiske hæren (bilde av SchoolHistory.co.uk)

Sadat gikk på andre barneskoler og ungdomsskoler i Kairo da faren plutselig kom tilbake fra hæren og flyttet familien bort fra landsbyen (Anwar Sadat 6). Etter eksamen i 1938 fra Kairo Military Academy, gikk han inn i den egyptiske hæren og ble stasjonert i Sudan (Al Jazeera). Mens han var der, utviklet han til slutt et vennskap med Gamal Abdel Nasser, som senere ble president i Egypt før Sadat ville etterfølge ham (Biography.com Aljazeera). Under andre verdenskrig jobbet de sammen for å prøve å tvinge Storbritannia fra Egypt ved å støtte og komme sammen med tyskerne (Encyclopædia Britannica). De gjorde dette ved å danne Free Officers Movement (Al Jazeera). På grunn av målene og samspillet med Tyskland, stoppet hans arbeid med bevegelsen imidlertid da han ble arrestert av britene i 1942 (Al Jazeera). Mens han rømte to år senere, ble han arrestert igjen i 1946, da han var involvert i drapet på Amin 'Uthman, en minister til støtte for britene (Biography.com). Da han ble frikjent og løslatt i 1948, meldte han seg kort tid etter igjen til Free Officers Movement, som Nasser drev på den tiden (Biography.com).

Gjennom denne revolusjonære gruppen styrtet Sadat og Nasser kong Farouk I, den daværende monarken i Egypt, i 1952 (Al Jazeera). Etterpå støttet Sadat Nassers valg som Egypts andre president i 1956, og endte opp med å bli visepresident fra 1964 til 1966 og 1969 til 1970 (Encyclopædia Britannica Biography.com).

Nasser døde i september 1970, og forlot Sadat som fungerende president før han ble offisielt valgt neste måned (Encyclopædia Britannica). Da han gikk opp til permanent verv begynte han å styre regjeringen bort fra Nassers politikk og ledelsesstil (Encyclopædia Britannica). Spesielt begynte han infitah, var en åpen dør-politikk ment å endre økonomien vesentlig ved å få utenlandske investeringer og handel (Encyclopædia Britannica). Dessverre førte dette til inflasjonen og store hull mellom sosioøkonomiske klasser som til slutt utløste matopptøyene i januar 1977 (Biography.com). Imidlertid var presidentskapet hans mer kjent mer av hans betydningsfulle beslutninger om forholdet i Midtøsten.

Anwar Sadat i uniform (bilde av Britannica.com)

Å starte Yom Kippur -krigen i 1973 var en av disse viktige avgjørelsene. Dette var i stor grad en gjengjeldelse mot Israel etter seksdagers -krigen i 1967, der Israel til den store skuffelse og ødeleggelse av Nasser og Sadat vant solid og tok tilbake enda mer territorium - hele Sinai -halvøya - samt ødela mye av Egypts offensive militær, inkludert dets luftvåpen (Al Jazeera). For å få tilbake landet, slo Sadat seg sammen med den syriske hæren for å overraske-angripe Israel på Yom Kippur, den jødiske høytiden for forsoningsdagen (Encyclopædia Britannica). Selv om det ikke var en fullstendig suksess, dukket Sadat opp som en respektert leder i det arabiske samfunnet, og merkelig nok startet fredsforhandlinger igjen mellom nasjonene (Biography.com).

Det var i løpet av de siste årene av hans presidentskap at Sadat engasjerte seg i intensiv kommunikasjon med Israel. Sadat var faktisk den første arabiske lederen som dro til Jerusalem, for ikke å snakke om den første som dro dit for å inngå en fredsavtale (Al Jazeera). I 1977 møtte han det israelske Knesset, Israels parlament, for å dele planene hans (Encyclopædia Britannica). I 1978 fløy han og Israels statsminister Menachim Begin til Camp David, Maryland, for å forhandle fram en avtale sammen med USAs president Jimmy Carter (Al Jazeera Encyclopædia Britannica). Ut av dette møtet kom Camp David -avtalene, som fungerte som en foreløpig fredsavtale mellom de to nasjonene (Biography.com). Dette førte til slutt til en annen fredsavtale som ble undertegnet i 1979 - den første i sitt slag mellom en arabisk nasjon og Israel (Biography.com). Det satte en stopper for den kontinuerlige krigstilstanden de hadde vært i siden 1948 (Al Jazeera).

Sadat, Carter og Begin ler på møtet for Camp David -avtalene (bilde med tillatelse fra ShareAmerica.gov)

På grunn av jakten på fred med Israel, den mangeårige fienden til Egypt og landene rundt, brakte Sadat ondskap mot seg selv fra de som hadde lignende tanker som han en gang gjorde som ung. Selv om hans streben etter fred gledet mange rundt om i verden - han og Begin til og med mottok Nobels fredspris for deres prestasjon - gjorde det opprørt det muslimske brorskapet, som mente at enhver innrømmelse med den omstridte nasjonen var en forræderisk handling (Biography.com). Som et resultat ble Sadat myrdet 6. oktober 1981 av muslimske ekstremister (Biography.com).

Anwar Sadat dagen for attentatet hans (bildet med tillatelse fra AlJazeera.com)

Selv om han fortsatt er en kontroversiell og ganske kompleks offentlig person, som involverer seg selv i moralsk diskutable situasjoner, tror jeg at Anwar Sadat etterlot seg en arv etter fred. Under en utenlandsreise til sommeren hadde jeg og mine jevnaldrende muligheten til å dra til Israel/Palestina for å lære så mye vi kunne om de komplekse konfliktene og den rike historien bak de anspente og til tider voldelige forholdene i Midtøsten. Gruppen vår fokuserte imidlertid ikke bare på konfliktene vi undersøkte hvordan forsoning kan se ut, samt hva som skal til for å komme dit.

Selv om fred fremdeles er et nåværende mål som ikke er fullt tilgjengelig ennå, ble vår gruppe oppmuntret av å vite at fredsavtaler hadde begynt, hovedsakelig på grunn av Anwar Sadat. Det er i stor grad på grunn av hans initiativ at denne fredsprosessen begynte i Midtøsten. Med historien hans å se tilbake på, er det fortsatt håp om fred og forsoning i Israel, Palestina og de omkringliggende arabiske nasjonene.

Sadat, Carter og Begin etter å ha signert avtalene (bilde av ShareAmerica.gov)

Utvalgt bilde med tillatelse fra AlphaHistory.com

Anwar Sadat. "Fra Mit Abul-Kum til Aliens ’ fengsel." Anwar El-Sadat: På jakt etter identitet, en selvbiografi, Harper Row, 1978, s. 2–40.


Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat (1918-1981)

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, tredje president for Egypt etter uavhengighet (som styrte fra 1970 til 1981), ble født med bondebakgrunn i Nildelta-landsbyen Mit Abu al-Kum 25. desember 1918. Sønnen, egyptisk hærskriver og en sudanesisk husmor, ble Sadat utdannet i Kairo, dit familien flyttet i 1925. Som et resultat av den anglo-egyptiske traktaten fra 1936 var tilgangen til Militærakademiet ikke lenger begrenset til overklassen, og i 1938 var Sadat en kommisjonær. .

Al-Sadat ble involvert i underjordiske politiske aktiviteter i 1941, sammen med andre som ønsket å styrte britisk styre, inkludert løytnanter Gamal Abdel-Nasser og Zakariah Mohieddin. Sadat sluttet seg også til høyreorienterte hemmelige grupper som Young Egypt og Muslim Brotherhood. Gjennom 1940 -årene var han inn og ut av fengsel for å ha samarbeidet med tyske agenter og konspirert i en rekke attentatforsøk. På slutten av tiåret var Sadat ute av fengsel, gjeninnført i hæren og hadde giftet seg med den godt forbundne, halv-britiske Jihan Safwat Rouf. I 1950 ba Nasser Sadat om å melde seg inn i Free Officer's Movement, etter å ha kjent til sitt engasjement i anti-britiske organisasjoner.

Da Nasser og andre hæroffiserer ledet et militærkupp 23. juli 1952 mot kong Farouk, ble Sadat valgt til å kunngjøre kuppledernes første proklamasjoner på radioen. Sadat ble også gjort til medlem av Revolutionary Command Council, hvor han fungerte som bindeledd for Det muslimske brorskapet og redaktør for den offisielle avisen, al-Jumhuriah. Da Nasser snart styrket hånden og presset ut opposisjonen, støttet Sadat lojal den mektige lederen. Han ble belønnet med en rekke fremtredende stillinger: Statsminister i 1954, taler for nasjonalforsamlingen i Den forente arabiske republikk i 1958, og visepresident fra 1964 til 1967 og senere fra 1969 til 1970. I 1969 ble visepresidentskapet var begrenset fra syv stoler til en, med Sadat som vant enkeltavtalen over Ali Sabri, som Nasser så på som en voksende politisk trussel. Da Nasser døde i 1970, valgte den egyptiske nasjonalforsamlingen Sadat -president med en margin på 90%.

Da han tok makten, lovet Sadat på en klok måte en fortsettelse av Nassers politikk. I 1972 utviste han 15 000 sovjetiske rådgivere og begynte et tettere forhold til USA. Sadat fortsatte forbindelsene med Syria og andre tradisjonelle nasseristiske allierte, men vokste også nærmere Saudi -Arabia.

Krigen i oktober 1973 med Israel var en politisk suksess for Sadat. Han brukte sin politiske hovedstad fra seieren til å sette i gang fredsforhandlinger med Israel, som kulminerte i Camp David -fredsavtalen fra 1979, et år før han godtok Nobels fredspris 1978. Sadat brukte også hans legitimasjon fra krigen i 1973 for å begynne sin politikk om å liberalisere økonomien og velte Nassers sosialistiske system.

Nær slutten av sin periode slo Sadat til mot en voksende opposisjon, arresterte 1600 mennesker fra et bredt område av opposisjonen og reverserte en rekke av sine tidligere posisjoner. Because of these changes in his views and policies, Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat was assassinated by a group called Jihad in 1981.


When Anwar Sadat came to Jerusalem 40 years ago

The Knesset on Tuesday marked the 40 year anniversary of the historic visit by former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat to Israel, which paved the way for the peace deal between the two former enemy countries.

On November 20, 1977, Sadat became the first — and so far only — Arab leader to visit Israel and address the Knesset with a call for peace.

Sadat’s visit heralded Israeli-Egyptian talks at Camp David a year later, and a full peace agreement in 1979, just six years after the painful Yom Kippur War.

After arriving at Ben Gurion Airport on November 19, Sadat met with Begin. The next day, he prayed at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, and visited the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial, before heading to Israel’s parliament to give his speech (full text here).

“I sincerely tell you that before us today lies the appropriate chance for peace, if we are really serious in our endeavors for peace. It is a chance that time cannot afford once again. It is a chance that, if lost or wasted, the plotter against it will bear the curse of humanity and the curse of history,” Sadat told the Knesset in Arabic.

Photographs from the visit show Sadat deep in conversation with Israeli leaders, flower-adorned schoolchildren waiting in Jerusalem for a glimpse of the Egyptian president, and journalists from around the world frantically dispatching their reports.


Sadat’s Egypt (1970-1981)

President Anwar al-Sadat

Anwar Sadat (1918-1981) changed course radically. He abandoned the Soviet-style policy of centralized economic planning and introduced free-market mechanisms under the slogan Infitah (opening). Foreign investment was welcomed, and thousands of economic advisors from the Soviet Union were sent home.

Sadat’s ambition was to reassert Egypt after its demoralizing defeat in the 1967 War. After fruitless political overtures to the United States, Israel’s main supporter, he prepared, in cooperation with Syria, for a surprise attack on Israel. So on 6 October 1973 Egypt launched an offensive, crossing the Suez Canal and overwhelming the Israeli forces. Shortly afterwards, however, in an Israeli counteroffensive, Egypt lost most of the territory that it had won at the outset of the war. Both Israel and Egypt soon saw a ceasefire as the best option. Sadat is remembered for going to war with Israel at a time when most world powers thought this an impossible mission, after the disastrous defeat the Arabs suffered in 1967. Sadat later said he did not plan to launch a wide war against Israel or to restore all territories Egypt lost in the Sinai Peninsula. He said he wanted to push the United States, occupied with the Cold War against the Soviet Union at that time, to open peace talks between the two sides in order to reclaim Arab lands Israel had occupied in 1967.

Camp David Accord

President Anwar al-Sadat, US President Jimmy Carter and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel shake hands in front of the White House in Washington, 1979.

In the following years Sadat established friendly relations with the United States and began negotiations with Israel. In 1977, he travelled to Jerusalem, the first Arab leader to visit Israel, and addressed the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset. In 1978, the Camp David Accord was signed by Sadat and the Israeli Prime Mnister, Menachem Begin (1913-1992). Egypt recognized Israel’s right to exist, and Israel agreed to a complete withdrawal from the Sinai. Although some arrangements were made concerning the future of the Palestinians, Egypt’s Arab neighbours considered Sadat’s unilateral deal with Israel treason to the Arab cause and the President thus a traitor. Egypt was thrown out of the Arab League (League of Arab States). Its headquarters was moved from Cairo to Tunis. Sadat initially tried to win over the population by allowing them more freedom. An extensive amnesty was granted to political prisoners, including leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood who had been imprisoned by his predecessor, Nasser. Press censorship was relaxed, and the establishment of political parties was allowed in 1977.

Sadat’s economic policies seemed to be paying off. Gulf Arab governments, flush with money from high oil prices, invested heavily, but the new wealth was not distributed evenly. While the rich and a new middle class benefited, the poor remained poor, and Sadat’s last years in office were marked by charges of corruption against the new business class that benefited from the Infitah policy.

The assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat

As social discord grew, Sadat countered leftist opposition by allowing more freedom to the political Islamic groups, but when the Islamists turned their criticism to Sadat and his economic policies, corruption, and the peace accord with Israel, he tried to rein them in again by ordering a clamp-down in September 1981. Thousands of Muslim fundamentalists and other political opponents were arrested. Sadat was assassinated in Cairo on 6 October 1981, during a military parade, by a number of officers and soldiers linked to al-Jamaa al-Islamiya (the Islamic Group).


27 Photos of the Events Surrounding the Anwar Sadat Assassination

The men had jumped out of a military truck that was part of the parade and began firing indiscriminately into the crowd, emptying their weapons. Despite a large military demonstration, gunfire was not returned for 45 seconds. BT Extremists assassinate Anwar Sadat in Cairo, 1981. rarehistoricaphotos Egyptian soldiers tend to the wound after an attack on the reviewing platform which killed Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. rarehistoricalphots Sadat was ostensibly murdered because he had reneged on his promise to institute Sharia law, he had made peace with Israel and because of his ties with the United States. mooserider 06 Oct 1981, Cairo, Egypt. Victim of Assassination. Image by © Kevin Fleming/CORBIS Three former U.S. Presidents arrive in Cairo for the Sadat&rsquos funeral. Gerald Ford (top left), Richard Nixon (top right), Jimmy Carter (front). BT The Coffin containing the body of assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, traveling on a carriage, is followed by heads of state to its resting place, Cairo Egypt, October 9, 1981. Getty Funeral procession of the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, Cairo, October 1981. Pinterest The flag-draped coffin of President Anwar Sadat escorted by military honor guard en route to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Getty Time Magazine cover after the assassination of Anwar Sadat. Tid Ayman al-Zawahiri stands behind bars in an Egyptian court in 1982 during his trial as one of the alleged masterminds of the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Getty Images Khalid Islambouli shouting I am the murderer of Pharaoh, I am the assassin of the tyrant in the way of Allah. Pinterest Mufti Omar Abdel-Rahman, a cleric convicted in the US for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, approved the assassination of Anwar Sadat. Alchetron


Anwar Sadat’s Historic Visit To Israel

I t was a visit like no other in Israel’s history.

Forty years ago, on November 19 at 7:59 p.m., a Boeing 707, code-named Egypt 01, landed at Ben-Gurion Airport, one minute ahead of schedule. Anwar Sadat, the president of Egypt, had arrived in Israel, the first Arab head of state to set foot in the Jewish state.

Only four years earlier, Israel and Egypt had been locked in mortal combat in the Yom Kippur War, which exacted a fearsome toll on both sides.

Now, in an astonishing turn of events that shocked and angered Arabs, Sadat entered the lion’s den, determined to break the costly cycle of animosity and violence that had pitted Israel against Egypt in five wars and numerous skirmishes.

Anwar Sadat following his arrival in Israel

Israelis were generally euphoric, hoping that Sadat’s trip might be a precursor to ending the long-running Arab-Israeli dispute. But some Israelis, still reeling from Egypt’s surprise attack on the first day of the 1973 war, were paranoiac. The chief of staff of the Israeli armed forces, General Mordechai Gur, warned Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin that Sadat’s historic visit could well be a devilishly clever cover for something far more sinister.

Disregarding Gur’s warning, Begin received Sadat with all the ceremonial trappings befitting such a momentous occasion, including a 21-gun salute.

As Sadat, clad in a light grey suit, descended from the aircraft, he was met by Israeli President Ephraim Katzir, Begin, members of his cabinet, army generals and a host of Israeli political celebrities. When he greeted Golda Meir, who had been prime minister during the Yom Kippur War, he said, “Madam, I have wanted to meet you for a long time.” When he ran into Ariel Sharon, the general who had turned the tide of the war in the Sinai Peninsula, he said, “I was hoping to trap you over there.”

Anwar Sadat chats with Golda Meir

Once the ceremony ended, Sadat and Katzir were driven to Jerusalem in a black bullet-proof limousine borrowed from the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv. Sadat spent the remainder of his time in Jerusalem, conferring with Begin and his ministers, visiting the Al Aqsa Mosque in the eastern sector of the city and addressing the Knesset.

Sadat’s trip to Israel was carefully planned.

In mid-September of that auspicious year, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan met the Egyptian deputy prime minister, Hassan Tohami, in Morocco to discuss that very possibility. Tohami, having learned from Dayan that Israel was ready to vacate the Sinai in return for peace, reported the news to Sadat, who believed the Arab-Israeli conflict was 70 percent psychological and 30 percent substance.

Before the 1973 war, Sadat had begun to radically realign Egypt’s foreign policy.

In 1971, a year after he succeeded Gamal Abdel Nasser as president, he offered Israel peace in exchange for a full withdrawal from the Sinai. The following year, he loosened Egypt’s relationship with the Soviet Union — its chief arms supplier and principal source of diplomatic support — by expelling 25,000 Russian advisors. Having concluded that what had been taken by force could only be restored by military means, he launched the 1973 war in coordination with Syria to regain the Sinai and the Golan Heights. He embraced the United States as an alternative to the Soviet Union. He worked with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and U.S. President Richard Nixon to facilitate Israeli withdrawals from Sinai.

By 1977, with the United States and the Soviet Union planning a Middle East peace conference in Geneva, he was poised to take his biggest leap forward.

Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife visited Washington in 1973 as guests of Richard Nixon and his spouse

On a visit to Romania — the only Soviet bloc country that had not severed diplomatic ties with Israel during or after the 1967 Six Day War — Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu persuaded Sadat that Begin sought a rapprochement with Egypt and that he would abide by the terms of an accord.

On November 9, Sadat delivered a speech in which he promised to go “to the ends of the earth,” even to the Knesset, to end the wars that had consumed the lives of thousands of Egyptian soldiers and sapped its economy. On November 11, Begin formally invited Sadat to Israel, an invitation he accepted two days later.

Sadat’s decision caused a firestorm in Egypt and the Arab world.

Egypt’s foreign minister, Ismail Fahmi, resigned as politicians from the semi-tolerated opposition urged Sadat to reconsider. Syria denounced Sadat’s go-it-alone diplomacy as a “painful blow to the Arab nation, a defiance and fragmentation of its national solidarity.”

The only Arab counties that refrained from attacking Sadat were Jordan, Morocco and Sudan.

The Palestine Liberation Organization blasted Sadat as a traitor who would violate “the dearest and most scared goals” of the Palestinians. In Beirut, a leading Lebanese newspaper, al-Safir, compared Sadat to Theodor Herzl, the founder of the modern Zionist movement, and Arthur James Balfour, the British foreign minister after whom the 1917 Balfour Declaration is named.

Ignoring the fire and the brimstone, Sadat ventured forth to Israel, certain that his remarkable gesture could usher in an era of peace and prosperity for Egypt, a nation proud of its past but mired in the grip of underdevelopment and poverty.

Anwar Sadat delivers a speech at the Knesset

Addressing the Knesset, he offered assurances to Israelis. As he put it, “Today I tell you, and declare it to the whole world, that we accept to live with you in permanent peace based on justice.”

But in a reference to the Palestinians, he said, “The Palestinian problem is the core and essence of the conflict and that, so long as it continues to be unresolved, the conflict will continue to aggravate, reaching new dimensions. In all sincerity, I tell you that there can be no peace without the Palestinians. It is a grave error of unpredictable consequences to overlook or brush aside this cause.”

And in a comment that irked Begin and like-minded politicians, Sadat said that Israel had to withdraw to its pre-1967 border and accept Palestinian self-determination.

Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin meet after Sadat’s arrival at Ben-Gurion Airport

Begin, in his speech, did not even mention the Palestinian question and reiterated his belief that the West Bank rightfully belonged to Israel rather than to the Palestinians.

It was clear that Israel and Egypt were far apart on the key issues, but when Sadat returned to Cairo, he claimed his visit has shattered ”all barriers of doubt, mistrust and fear.” He was too sanguine. In the months ahead, Egypt’s bilateral negotiations with Israel bogged down over differences on the Palestinians and other issues. Frustrated by the impasse, Sadat condemned the Israelis as stiff-necked.

Jimmy Carter, the president of the United States, broke the deadlock at the Camp David summit in Maryland in September 1978, a two-week marathon that yielded agreements on ”a framework for peace.” The intensive talks that followed produced Israel’s 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, the first such agreement between Israel and an Arab state. It, in turn, led to Israel’s complete withdrawal from the Sinai and to Palestinian autonomy talks that went nowhere.

Sadat paid dearly for his vision and courage. On October 6, 1981, the eighth anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, he was assassinated by homegrown Islamic fundamentalists as he reviewed a “victory” parade in Cairo. His vice-president, Hosni Mubarak, survived the onslaught and replaced Sadat.

Israel’s official relationship with Egypt, cool and limited for the past 38 years, has weathered a series of storms. But since the military coup of 2013, which brought Abdul Fatah al-Sisi to power, Israel and Egypt have upgraded their covert cooperation in intelligence gathering to combat an upsurge of Islamic terrorism in the Sinai.

On the grassroots level, Israel remains unpopular with the vast majority of Egyptians, due in part to the unresolved Palestinian problem. But thanks to Sadat, Israel forged peaceful relations with the most powerful and influential nation in the Arab world. As the scholar Martin Kramer tellingly reminds us, Egypt and Israel now have been at peace longer than they were at war.


Anwar Sadat and the Camp David Negotiations

The Camp David Accords, which were negotiated over a period of twelve days in 1978 between Egyptian, Israeli, and American delegations at the Presidential retreat of Camp David, Maryland, marked a historical watershed as Egypt became the first Arab state to recognize Israel. It led to the signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979. The negotiation process required constant compromise between the two nations, and there were numerous moments when it appeared that disagreements over parts of the framework would lead to the collapse of the entire process.

The reason it did not collapse can be attributed in no small way to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, whose statesmanship and nearly authoritarian power allowed him to make concessions and negotiate with greater flexibility than his Israeli counterparts. His ability to build a strong rapport with President Jimmy Carter was crucial to the negotiating process, as it allowed the two presidents to speak frankly and approach issues in ways they could not be in a more formal negotiating process.

But such political risks, even in the name of peace, often carry enormous downsides. His friendliness towards Israel led to condemnation of his policies and eventually, his assassination.

Robert Korn worked as the Director of Israeli Affairs in the State Department’s Near Eastern Affairs Bureau from 1978-1982. Robert Hunter was a member of the White House National Security Council during the Carter Administration and was heavily involved in the Camp David negotiations. Herbert Hansell was the Legal Advisor to the State Department under the Carter Administration and was involved in drafting the Camp David frameworks, as well as the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty) negotiations with the Soviet Union. Alfred Leroy “Roy” Atherton Jr. was Ambassador to Egypt from 1979-1983 and attended the military procession at which Anwar Sadat was assassinated.

Korn, Hunter, and Hansell were all interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, Korn beginning in December 1990, Hunter in August 2004, and Hansell in March 1995. Atherton was interviewed by Dayton Mak beginning in the summer of 1990.

Read Hal Saunders’ account of the get-acquainted session for the parties at Leeds Castle. Go here for Atherton’s full account of the lead-up to Sadat’s assassination and the aftermath. Click here for other Moments on the Middle East.

“It would have collapsed right there if it had not been for Sadat”

Robert Korn, Director of Israeli Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, 1978-1982

KORN: For those of us who had worked on the Arab-Israeli problem before, it was really hard to imagine that Carter was going to achieve this goal of peace, an overall settlement that he announced. There seemed to be a great element of unreality to the policy discussions we would have.

After a meeting with [Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs] Roy Atherton and later on with [Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs] Hal Saunders, we had discussions on how the agreement was going to be structured and I think I was not the only one who felt that this was really a kind of daydreaming exercise.

And it would have remained that way had not Sadat broken with the other Arabs and decided to go to Jerusalem (pictured) and Carter was able to lead him little by little to accept the idea of a peace agreement now and not 20 years in the future. But if Sadat had not been willing to go all the way to break with the other Arabs this would not have occurred.

The whole business of a Geneva Peace Conference was absolutely unrealistic. Carter for the first ten months of his presidency was going for just getting a conference to convene at Geneva. We were going to worry about what we do at Geneva after we got there. It was a desperate, unrealistic effort and would have collapsed right there if it had not been for Sadat.

Certainly Sadat had the view that [Former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel] Nasser had made a mistake in challenging the West and siding with the Soviet Union and that Nasser had brought great ruin on Egypt through the 󈨇 War and through the war of attrition that followed it. He felt that the way to bring Egypt out of its difficulties was to reach an agreement with Israel and to re-establish good relations with the West — that was where the money was and there is where prosperity would come, it would not come from the Soviet Bloc.

I myself was concerned at a certain point that Sadat was going further than he could afford to go. That he would be overthrown. And that the Peace Treaty that we were sponsoring and pushing very hard for after Camp David could end up getting Sadat thrown out. That did not happen. It happened later — that got him assassinated. So there was that concern.

The summer of 󈨑 to the summer of 󈨒…we were trying to get the Geneva Conference reconvened. The idea was to reach an overall settlement there. This proved impossible.

Sadat made his speech and went to Jerusalem and immediately thereafter there began an effort to parlay this visit to Jerusalem into something broader — basically into a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt.

There was a conference in Cairo between the Israelis and Egyptians and all the other Arabs were invited but no one else came. [Secretary of State Cyrus] Vance went out to Jerusalem and I went on this mission in January of 1978 for a meeting of what was called the Political Committee — in other words, sit down and try to lay out the terms for an agreement between Egypt and Israel. After Sadat went to Jerusalem our effort was to build on it and make it into something.

As Begin refused to make any serious concessions, the Egyptians became more and more disenchanted. Sadat was under increasing pressure from home and from other Arabs. The Saudis were offering him a lot of money to pull out of it.

Finally in the late summer of 1978, Carter decided the thing was going to collapse unless he did something. He decided to go for broke. He sent Vance out again to the area, I went on this trip, to talk to Begin and then Sadat and invite them to come to Camp David. This was not announced until afterwards. After the trip was announced, Vance dispatched Atherton to Saudi Arabia and Jordan to explain to the governments there what the purpose was — what we hoped to accomplish at Camp David — and to try to get their support….

“Sadat was dragging his advisors along with him kicking and screaming”

Begin couldn’t refuse the President of the United States inviting him to come to Camp David to talk with the Egyptian leader.

The remarkable thing on the Egyptian side was the extent that Sadat was dragging his advisers along with him. They were going kicking and screaming. They didn’t want to go in that direction.

The Foreign Minister, Mohammed Kamel, had several nervous breakdowns. Sadat sent him to Jerusalem in January of 󈨒 for the Political Committee meeting and I remember the poor man remarking to me that he was in Jerusalem for two or three days and didn’t sleep the whole time because it made him so nervous the whole time to be there in an Israeli city. He broke into tears at the Leeds Conference in July of 󈨒. Osama El-Baz was there and reminded me of [Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph] Goebbels in his demeanor. All of them were just dead set against it but they had to go along. They did go along but at every stage they tried to torpedo the thing.

Robert Hunter, NSC, Director of Middle Eastern Affairs, 1979-1981

HUNTER: Because Carter had created a situation which had an opportunity to work, Sadat did what he did. Incidentally, we calculated, we analyzed, whether or not Sadat ever pronounced on this, that he had run the ’73 War in order to show that he had guts, so that he could then make peace in order to rescue his country from this conundrum of having to look like he was an Arab in fighting Israel, which didn’t really matter much to him.

The Egyptians always have this duality. They’re Arabs when it’s useful, they’re not Arabs when it’s not useful. I remember being with Sadat with [Senator] Ted Kennedy, it was about ’73 or ‘74. At one point in the meeting, at Sadat’s home at the Barrages, outside of Cairo, Kennedy raised the issue of Saudi Arabia. And Sadat said, “Saudi Arabia? Who are they? They are these people who came out of the desert. But I am Egypt.” You heard the whole Pharaonic thing, you know. (Photo: Keystone-France/Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images)

So the Israeli strategic calculation was that the only country that could make war potentially successfully was Egypt. If you took Egypt out of the military balance, any rationally calculated Arab attack on Israel dropped virtually to the vanishing point. I say rationally, there’s always irrationality. After all, since Israel had beaten all-comers with Egypt in the military balance, nothing was going to happen with Egypt out of the balance.

“The Israelis may have been better coordinated, but Sadat was the master negotiator”

Herbert Hansell, State Department Legal Advisor, 1977-1979

HANSELL: Well, clearly, the Israelis were more cohesive and better organized as a negotiating team. However, I would say that President Anwar Sadat and Prime Minister Begin were both masters at identifying their fundamental objectives and manipulating their constituencies to achieve them.

I think Sadat was superb. He played the Egyptian people like a piano. Of course, he had some comparative advantages. There wasn’t an army of reporters following him. His every move was not reported in the press in Israel, which is a vigorous democracy and in which every newspaper knows virtually everything that is going on, as is the case in Washington. The Egyptians were just as good and as tough negotiators [as the Israelis], but I think that Sadat had considerably more room to maneuver and more flexibility.

In the end, he basically gave President Carter just as much as Carter needed to strike a deal. You may remember that Carter made a last, final trip to Israel to try to close the gap between the parties. There was a very dramatic moment, when it looked as if the whole negotiation had fallen apart.

At the end of the next to the last day we were there, the planes were at the airport, ready to go home. There was one final round of discussions set for the next morning. We worked all night on various issues.

Finally, we and the Israelis arrived at a compromise of proposals on the remaining outstanding issues, which President Carter undertook to present to President Sadat. Carter met with Sadat at the airport in Cairo. It was clear that this was it — or nothing.

It was quite a tense occasion: after several hours’ discussion, Sadat agreed to the proposal, over objections of some of his advisers. I think that Sadat had a greater degree of flexibility and had more authority to compromise than Begin did. The Israelis may have been better coordinated, but I think that Sadat was the master negotiator. He was incredible.

The extraordinary thing to me, in the process of negotiating the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, was the way in which Prime Minister Begin, on the one hand, and President Sadat of Egypt, on the other, handled their respective ends of the negotiation. Each of them, of course, was a master at manipulating his people.

Sadat, in particular, “played” the Egyptian people like a piano. He was just so good. But he was only interested in the big issues, the big picture.

Begin, on the other hand, was a thorough and careful negotiator. The specific details interested him very much. He was the master of the whole picture. He, of course, came from an intensely democratic environment. Sadat, on the other hand, was in a situation where, within limits, his word was law. But they were both very astute leaders of their respective bodies politic.

It was really great theater to watch them operate. They seemed to develop a trust in one another, within limits they also were wary of each other. President Carter had a sharp understanding of each of them and their interaction with each other. I went on the trip to the Middle East with President Carter that finally put together the pieces which made the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty possible. It was a very dramatic three or four days, first in Cairo, then in Jerusalem, and then back to Cairo.

HUNTER: It was clear that the Sinai didn’t mean a hell of a lot to Begin and that that was basically a security issue and if security could be worked out there, the Israelis would not quibble over it. The real problem was the West Bank and Gaza on the Palestinian side. There Begin was pretty much unyielding. The idea in 1979 was autonomy. If you could get autonomy for the Occupied Territories or Administered Territories, depending on who’s saying it — Israelis said administered, the Egyptians said occupied…

Incidentally, the Egyptians did the negotiating, not the Jordanians, because Sadat didn’t want the Jordanians to do it, in part because the Egyptians wanted not only to keep control, but they wanted to keep American friendship and the money flowing, you know? They didn’t want the money to go to somebody else.

The Egyptians were the ones who did the negotiating for the Palestinians, but everybody knew that when anything was discussed, their people would run around the corner and talk to Arafat about it. We did talk to Palestinians, Palestinians who, in fact, I’m sure some were actually members of the PLO, but, so long as they were part of the Egyptian delegation, no one checked their credentials at the door….

The Autonomy Talks closed down as we got into the election season, because there was a political question there, but it wasn’t decided by Carter, it was decided by Sadat. Sadat, you can check the date, April or May or whatever it was, called off any further effort on the Autonomy Talks.

Most people said, “Oh, Sadat has given up on Begin, blah blah blah.” I was convinced that it was quite the opposite. That he was trying to protect Carter from having to take political risks in the negotiations that might cause Carter to lose the election, because Sadat wanted him to win, because Carter was the guy who was most likely to do something effective.

In my judgment at the time, Sadat had miscalculated. Carter wanted the process to go forward and was prepared to do what was necessary to see whether he could get some success, he was so deeply committed to it emotionally, morally, and strategically for the United States.

Q: And what happened one minute after high noon on Reagan’s Inauguration Day, January 20th, 1981?

HUNTER: Fortunately, my successor, Geoffrey Kemp, was a very close friend of mine. He called me in and said “What do I need to know?”

I remember two things I told him. I said, “One is that the Iraqis are building a nuclear reactor. If we don’t do something about it, the Israelis will. Second, we are overstressing Anwar Sadat. If we don’t back off a little bit, somebody’s going to kill him.”

“Clearly this was an assassination attempt at Sadat”

Alfred Leroy “Roy” Atherton Jr., Ambassador to Egypt, 1979-1983

ATHERTON: It was no secret that there were various groups, mostly Islamic fundamentalist groups, who had been trying for years to destabilize not just Sadat but his predecessor, Nasser.

But one of the first things Sadat did when he came to power was to decide that the real threat to him would come from the left, particularly since he had alienated the Russians, and he was afraid of the leftists and the crypto-communists in the small Egyptian Communist Party. [Read Atherton’s full account here.]

And so he amnestied all the Muslim Brotherhood leaders and made them respectable again, in the thought that they would be a counterweight to the threat from the left. It turned out in the end, of course, that they were the threat… There were spin-offs of the Brotherhood, militant spin-offs, clandestine spin-offs, who definitely looked to violent political action as a way of trying to change the regime.

Their objective was to achieve what Islamic fundamentalists basically had as their goal — to get the country back to the Koran, to make the Koran the law of the land, Islamic law and Islamic tradition, governing education, governing all aspects of society and all policies of the government. And that included not making peace with the infidel Israel, not being allied with the Western devils, the United States, and certainly not allowing women in public life, like Mrs. Sadat who became a public figure in her own right.

But there were lots of things that Sadat did, and Mrs. Sadat did, in their public life and in their public image, as well as in the policies of the government, that built up a very strong head of steam among the very conservative Islamic elements in Egypt against the regime.

There was increasing tension but no sign of how it was going to be resolved, until it was suddenly resolved by an assassin’s bullet at the October 6 parade, 1981, celebrating the October 1973 War, which Egypt had always celebrated as their victory.

Near the end of the parade, along came the heavy artillery with their crews sitting in the back of the trucks pulling the heavy guns. One of them stopped in front of the reviewing stand. The crew scrambled out.

Our assumption, and it was certainly Sadat’s assumption, was that this was going to be another one of these salutes for the president, as the paratroopers had been. They were going to come up to the stand and salute the president. The president stood up to take the salute. We all were watching. And at that moment, suddenly hand grenades were thrown and automatic weapons were being fired. Clearly this was an assassination attempt at Sadat.

It was ascertained that this was an Islamic fundamentalist cell led by an officer in the army that had infiltrated the military, got military uniforms and used forged papers and substituted them for the crew of this artillery prime mover. This was not in the mainstream of the Moslem Brotherhood but was a spinoff, a group dedicated to violent overthrow and to establish Islamic rule in the country.

To them Sadat had become the personification of evil, because he had made peace with Israel, because of his lifestyle, because he was seen as anti-Islamic. He had done all the things that the Islamic fundamentalists disapproved of. So it was no surprise that there were extremists in the Islamic movement who were out to destabilize the regime, including by assassination and other acts of violence.

[In the hours after the assassination attempt] I had a telephone call from former President Carter. He wanted to know what had happened to his friend Sadat….

It was a very strange kind of a funeral. In fact, it was a strange kind of mourning period. There was no outpouring of popular grief after Sadat’s assassination.

The city was very strangely muted the country was strange. There were some outbreaks of violence, some local incidents and instability, anti-government, to build on the Sadat assassination in some parts of Cairo and in some parts of Upper Egypt, none of which was difficult to contain, although there were some casualties in the process. But I think the more likely explanation was that in fact Sadat’s popular base had badly eroded by that time.

President Reagan announced that he was going to send a very special, high-powered delegation to Sadat’s funeral, in honor of our high respect for Sadat. There was a dinner that evening [after the funeral] for all members of the American delegation and the American Embassy at the hotel where the American delegation was staying an in-house dinner, with three presidents, each making remarks.

Probably the most personal, recalling his special relationship, were Jimmy Carter’s remarks. His were very personal, about his relationship with Sadat, the relationship between the Carter and the Sadat families.


Se videoen: Taking Everything Literally Part 2. Anwar Jibawi